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KHRUSHCHEV

I.

Personality

Kikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, First Secretary to the Central Committee of the CPSU, is a heavy-set man of medium height with a round, animated face and lively humorous features. His eyes have been described by responsible observers as both "dark" and "beady blue." He has three moles on his cheeks and a tiny slit scar under the nose. His smile reveals two gold bicuspids. His hair, once blond, is now thinning and almost completely grey. He has been described by western observers as a man with a great deal of warmth and charm--confident, relaxed, and fairly reasonable. It is agreed that, at the present time, he is the most voluble member of the Soviet leadership and in an animated conversation his enthusiasm for his own ideas sometimes exceeds his ability to be logical and to think through what he is going to say. He is now gaining a reputation as a heavy drinker.

As an Executive, Khrushchev has been termed a driver and laborious worker. He seems to have a practical turn of mind which appeals to common sense in approaching the most difficult problems. When elaborating on official instructions and criticisms of work performance he frequently draws on old Russian proverbs, quips, and slogans to put over his point.

Often such remarks strike a humorous vein and reveal in Khrushchev a feeling for the amusing side of life.

Khrushchev is married and is reported to have many daughters and at least two sons. Presumably out of affection for a Ukranian tradition, one of his daughters is named Rada, the Ukranian name for legislative assembly. The eldest of two known sons was killed during World War II while serving as a pilot. In 1953 the other boy was studying at an engineering institute. The identity of Madama Khrushcheva has not been disclosed to sources outside the UESR. One Khrushcheva (first name not given) was included in a list of "Old Bolsheviks" who signed a message of greeting to I. V. Stalin on November 7, 1947. Available information does not describe this individual further, but it is not impossible that this woman is married or related to N. S. Khrushchev. Unconfirmed reports, coming primarily from Soviet emigree circles and tending to be contradictory, state that Khrushchev has been G. M. Malenkov's father-in-law since about 1940. Such reports cannot be verified from available sources.

Khrushchev has resided a long time in Kiev which has equipped him with a thorough knowledge of the Ukranian language and mentality. He is said by one source to be very popular with Ukranians while remaining an ardent Communist and Russifier. Another source, however, which does not appear as well placed as the former, says that he is unpopular with non-party Ukranians. At one time, while serving in the Ukraine, Khrushchev doned the embroidered shirt, and on the whole dressed very simply. In recent years, however, his tastes have changed and he is known to appreciate

finely tailored and assorted clothing. His personal manners and style of speech are described as very simple and reportedly he possesses the knack of getting along with the masses. While he has a good technical education he apparently lacks cultural refinement and has a very hazy idea of life abroad and it is doubtful if he is interested.

- 4 -

II.

Chronological History

1894

1894 -

1916

Khrushchev was born on 17 April 1894 in the village of Kalinovka in Kursk Guberniya, just outside the Ukranian border. Although Soviet sources state that his father was a miner, it is more likely that he was a worker in the agricultural or forest in Kursk and later migrated to the Donbas mining area. As a boy Mikita worked as a shepherd and then as an apprentice fitter in Donbas factories. He presumably remained in the Ukraine during World War I (there being no record of his service in the Tsar's military forces) and also during the period of the Ukranian Rada.

1916 **-**1917

Khrushchev's transition to revolutionary activity is not verywell documented. It is possible that in 1916-17 he was influenced by the leadership of L. M. Kaganovich in the Stalino (then Yuzovka) region, where a Bolshevik party organization was active. Although described later by Soviet sources as an active fighter for the revolution from the first days of the October upheaval, Khrushchev nonetheless failed to join the party until sometime in 1918, after the establishment of Bolshevik power in Moscow and during his 24th year. According to a Soviet Biography (1935) he was assigned important work in the Civil War as a political worker against the forces of Denikin, and later against those of the Foles. Presumably he served under the Bolsheviks' "Revolutionary Committee," where he may have had contact with Ukranian Party leader S. V. Kosior and with K. Ye. Voroshilov, who commanded Red troops in the Stalino area.

1918

1919 -

Following this reported Civil War service Khrushchev worked in the Donbas mines until about 1922. He then attended a Workers' Faculty (Rabfak) as a student, where he simultaneously served as Secretary of the Party organization. After completing his course he became Secretary of a Rayon Party Committee in Stalino Chlast', and then advanced to leading Party posts in Stalino city. Before 1929 Khrushchev had been promoted to Party assignments in Kiev, where he very possibly had contact with L. M. Kaganovich, Secretary General of the Ukranian Party Central Committee during 1925-28. His subsequent career suggests that he had become a Kaganovich protege.

1929

From the Ukranian Party organization Khrushchev was transferred in 1929 to study in Moscow (following the return of Kaganovich to Central Party work in the Soviet capital). He attended the Industrial Academy, for heavy industry, imeni I. V. Stalin, an institute newly established along with other such academies to train industrial technicians.

1931

Khrushchev attained the trusted position of Secretary of the Academy's Party Committee, thus furthering his political and organizational experience. In 1931 he was made a Party Committee Secretary first of Bauman Rayon, then of Krasnopresenskiy Rayon, both industrial districts in the Moscow Party's city organization bossed (after 1930) by Kaganovich.

1932 **-**1934 Thereafter Khrushchev rose rapidly. During 1932-34 he understudied Kaganovich as Second Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, becoming in 1934 First Secretary in the City and Second in the Oblast'.

1935

He became First Secretary of both Moscow Committees when Kaganovich transferred to other duties in 1935. With this promotion he assumed direction of the most important municipal and regional organization in the Soviet Communist Party, including in its membership Central Party and government officials as well as local leaders.

Khrushchev's advance to leading party posts was made at the expense of local officials who were purged from the Moscow Party organization by trials of January 1935. Soviet biographers state that Khrushchev conducted an active fight against the rightist Uglanov elements and also against Trotskyite and Bukharinist deviationists for the make of Party purity, and so emerged as one of the outstanding representatives of the post-October line of Party workers trained by Stalin.

Khrushchev's political responsibilities in Moscow apparently included aspects of the construction of the metropolitan subway system.

Along with Kaganovich and Bulganin he received credit for the subway's successful inauguration. It has been reported that the subway was completed on schedule by means of ruthless disregard of the health and safety of the workers involved on the project. After 1935 his prominence entailed his participation in USSR government affairs. He served as a candidate member of the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive

Committee, to which he was elected in February 1935. He was one of the 30 Soviet officials who signed the new USSR Constitution in December 1936. Khrushchev did not gain membership on the Secretariat or Politburo of the All-Union Party Central Committee during this Moscow

1936

assignment. This oversight may have reflected Stalin's effort (after 1935) to reduce the personal power of Kaganovich, Khrushchev's patron.

1938

Barly in 1938, at the end of the Great Purges, Khrushchev was removed from the Moscow secretarial post and assigned to other important work. In late January of that year he was sent back to Kiev as First Secretary of the Ukranian Party Central Committee and simultaneously elevated to candidate membership on the Polithure of the All-Union Party Central Committee. The Ukranian post was vital not only because of the position which that area occupied in the industrial and agricultural economy of the USSR, but also because it was admittedly one of the first objectives of Hitler's declared expansionist policy. A year after his assignment Khrushchev was elevated to full membership in the Polithuro. His position in the Soviet political hierarchy at the time is evident in a May 1939 press listing of top Party officials: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Krushchev, Beriya, and Malenkov.

1939

In the Ukranian Party Khrushchev assumed a position similar to that of Stalin in the All-Union Party, as ranking member of the Politburo, Organizational Bureau, and Secretariat. Furthermore, he took personal control of the Kiev Oblast' and City Party organizations. From this powerful position he fashioned an administrative apparatus responsive to his command. Leading posts were assigned to previously little known men. One of his apparent errors in personnel matters, however, was the

selection of M. A. Burmistenko as his Second Secretary. During the war Burmistenko reportedly defected to the Germans, as did many other Ukranisms. After 1938 Khrushchev sat as a member of the Military Council of the Kiev Military District (then commanded by S. K. Timoshenko, and later by G. K. Zhukov). Following the German invasion Khrushchev served on military councils on the southern sectors of the front.

1942

Although not included among the members of the supreme wartime leadership, Khrushchev represented the Moscow Politburo in militarypolitical matters on the southern fronts and reportedly directed operations of certain partisan forces behind German lines. During 1942-43 he was a member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Pront. According to Khrushchev, he personally participated in the defense of Stalingrad. Subsequently he served on the Military Council of the Voronezh Front as the Germans retreated. He was awarded the military rank of Lieutenant General in 1943. The military men with whom he apparently associated during these years were: R. Ya. Malinovskiy, N. F. Vatutin, G. K. Zhukov, S. I. Konev, V. D. Sokolovskiy, and K. S. Moskalenko. Political officers who served with or under Kurushchev in 1943-44 included: F. F. Muznetsov, A. S. Zheltov, and D. T. Shepilov. Khrushchev probably resumed political duties as Ukranian Party First Secretary in late 1943, Kiev being liberated in Movember. Thereafter he exercised almost plenipotentiary powers in the republic, for in addition to his multiple Party posts he assumed in February 1944 the

1944

1943

1944 -1947 Office of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (later Ministers), replacing the Ukranian-born Korniyets. Between 1944 and 1947 he carried out a mass replacement of Ukranian Party and Government personnel by new cadres, and conducted an extensive campaign of propaganda and force to root out opposition elements within the population. He made a public announcement in 1946 of a drestic cadres turnover.

Despite Khrushchev's strenous efforts, the situation in the Ukraine evidently developed badly during 1946 and by early 1947 a severe crisis existed in the republic. Related in part at least to a general agricultural crisis throughout the Soviet Union, it was aggravated by economic dislocations caused by the war and the postwar reconstruction programs, and by the activities of resistence bands, particularly in the western oblasts. To deal with this crisis Stalin dispatched Eaganovich to Kiev to replace Ehrushchev as Ukranian Party First Secretary.

Circumstantial evidence, based in part on their former association in Moscow, suggests that Kaganovich may have served during this episode as the saviour of his former colleague Khrushchev. At any rate, the more experienced Jev proved the master of the situation, according to a purported eyewitness. Although Khrushchev remained as premier in the Ukraine after Kaganovich's advent, he was not reported as participating in public affairs there during April-

1947

November 1947. He was conspicuously absent from a plenum of the Central Committee in Kiev (June) and did not appear along with other Soviet leaders at the Tushino air show (August 3). An unconfirmed rumor put him in disfavor because of corruption emong Ukranian officials, while another report attributed his demotion and absence from public activity to poor health. Early in September 1947, hoever, Khrushchev appeared in a Politburo lineup in Moscow, and in December he regained the post of Ukranian Party First Secretary. Kaganovich returned to Moscow.

1949

What ever the reasons for Khrushchev's temporary eclipse in 1947, he resumed direction of Ukrainian Party affairs with no apparent loss of prestige, though without the full array of posts which he had held prior to March 1947. The premiership passed to Korotchenko and responsibility for the Kiev Party organization had already been assigned to Z.T. Serdyuk. During the next two years official reports stated that Ukranian agricultural yields had filled prescribed quotas, and in November 1949 G.M. Malenkov declared that Soviet grain problems had been solved.

1949

In December 1949 Khrushchev relinquished the top Ukrainian Party post and returned to Moscow to assume the duties of Party Chief of Moscow Oblast' and Secretary of the All-Union Party Central Committee as well. These assignments brought him for the first time into posts concerned with organizational work at the All-Union level. The mixth successive Secretary of the Party Central Committee to be appointed after the war ended, Khrushchev was also the last man added to the Secretariat before the 19th CPSU Congress. No less than five men had been dropped from the Party Secretariat (by death, demotion, or disgrace) between 1945 and 1949. In some respects, therefore, Khrushchev's advent marked a temporary stabilizing of the composition, and perhaps also of the operations, of the Secretariat.

Despite his belated assignment as a Party Secretary, Khrushchev (a member of the Politburo) became the third-ranking man in the Secretariat, behind Stalin and Malenkov but ahead of M.A. Suslov and P.K.

Ponomoranko. He did not have a seat in the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers (as did Stalin, Malenkov, and Ponomorenko after 1951), but he was the only Secretary to administer directly a major Party organization (Moscow). Although his exact responsibilities in the Secretariat until 1953 are not altogether clear, his work not only touched the Moscow and certain other Party organizations, but also concerned central organizational matters like the Party Statuto.

1949

In returning as Moscow Party Chief in December 1949 Khrushchev resumed a status which he had occupied during 1935-38 and thereby returned the capital to its Party manager of the 1930's and in a sense marked a rejection of the leadership group which had been built up there since 1938. Since many of the Moscow leaders from 1938 to 1949 may have been close associates and followers of Malenkov, circumstantial evidence suggests that Khrushchev's advent in 1949 was a step directed against Malenkov's growing political powers. In any event, Khrushchev set about to transform the party machine that had been built up in Moscow since 1938. A new slate of Secretaries were elected to both the City and the Oblast' Party organizations and in the succeeding months the City and Oblast' Party bureaus and Ispolkoms were fundamentally re-staffed. By the time the Moscow Party organization elected delegates to the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952, its political complexion had changed significantly.

1952

1953

In March 1953 Khrushchev was appointed ranking Secretary of the

Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and was released from his duties as Moscow Party chief. In September 1953 he was designated First Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Although N.A. Hikhaylov (conceivably a follower of Malenkov) was assigned to replace Khrushchev during the political readjustments following Stalin's death, this arrangement was undone in March 1954, and the group which Khrushchev developed after 1949 now appears firmly in control. There has emerged in the Moscow apparatus since 1950 a non-indigenous group of officials which is becoming more important. The evidence suggests that these may be the elements of a political fence which Khrushchev constructed out of his former associates in the Ukraine and elsewhere as a protection against increased political power of Malenkov. Finally, since Khrushchev's elevation in 1953, the Moscow Party First Secretary has not rated a seat in the top level Party high command, which may well be interpreted as a measure to preclude the emergence of political adversaries.

Prior to 1950 Party chieftains in outlying big cities such as
Leningrad and Minsk as well as those in the Caucasus, Baltic States
and Moldavia enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy. Concurrently
with what appeared to be the program to undercut the power of Malenkov
in the Moscow Party organization a series of political manipulations
were carried out to reduce the stature of the men holding these outlying
positions and to make them more responsive to central control. It seems
safe to say that Khrushehev alone did not initiate these various measures;

nevertheless, he appears to have been rather closely associated with their implementation and has undoubtedly benefited from them since his emergence as CPSU First Secretary. A tie possibly linking Khrushchev with these developments is his occupation in the months before the 19th CPSU Congress (October 1952) with the revision of the Party Statute, a decument defining the powers and functions of Party organs.

1952

Mhrushchev's experience in the Ukraine, whose Party organization was patterned closely after that of the All-Union Communist Party, probably assisted him in the work of modifying the Party by-laws. The more important changes which he proposed were: replacement of the historic Politburo by an expanded Presidium, clear differentiation of functions between Presidium and Secretariat, and abolition of the Orgburo. The duties of the Orgburo were absorbed by the Secretariat. The revised Statute also provided for the contraction of republic central committee and regional and local committee secretariats from five to three members.

1953

The departure of Malenkov from the Party Secretariat in March 1953 opened the way for Khrushchev to exercise undivided supervision over personnel matters. It appears that he has not only introduced Ukrainian associates and others believed to be his followers into the Central Party apparatus but has appointed some of them to the Party organization of the R.S.F.S.R. as well. The military establishment and the Soviet government have also felt Khrushchev's appointing powers. Not only have Ukrainian generals like A.A. Grechko and A.I. Yeremenko received advancement, but many of Khrushchev's former associates on the wartime

fronts have been given key assignments.

Since Khrushchev's emergence as Party First Secretary in 1953 he has adopted a role resembling that of chief Party whip and trouble shooter, travelling extensively and dealing with many local problems on the spot. Moreover, he has played a well-publicized part not only in organizational and personnel questions but in other matters pertaining to government operations and to foreign Communist Parties. At the February 195h plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, for example, he voiced great concern with various government operations. Charging inadequate performance of duties connected with agricultural production he chastised a considerable number of high state officials. In addition, he recommended changes in the location and administration of certain ministries concerned with exploiting natural resources. Both the tone of his remarks and their full publication indicated possible discord in the collective leadership.

Perhaps even more publicly than it did before 1953, the CPSU Secretariat under Khrushchev has played an active part in the conduct of relations with other Communist Parties, especially those of the orbit countries. Khrushchev himself represented the CPSU at the Second Congress of the Polish United Workers Party in Warsaw and he likewise travelled to Prague for the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Since 1944, in fact, the world press has carried an ever increasing volume of commentary on Khrushchev's expanding contact not only with orbit countries but western nations as well.

1954

-16-

III.

Discussion

It is apparent from the foregoing brief history that there are many gaps in our knowledge of the details of Khrushchev's activities from his earliest boyhood right up to the present time. It is fairly clear that Khrushchev was moved from the Ukraine to Moscow as a protege of Kaganovich. In fact the older man seems to have looked after Khrushchev throughout his career. Khrushchev was almost invariably appointed to higher positions to replace men who were being purged, usually with the influence of Kaganovich discornible behind the scenes.

Reliable observers who have come into contact with the Soviet chieftains since Stalin's death acknowledge Khrushchev's great energies and abilities as a politician but tend to discount the possibility that he will, like Stalin, attain unchallenged primacy in the Soviet political hierarchy. His status reflects in part the regime's post-Stalin pattern of separating the administrative heads of Party and state at the all-union level in an effort to implement collective leadership. Although it formalizes the leading position which Khrushchev attained in the Secretariat in March 1953, his title of First Secretary differs from Stalin's former designation as Secretary General. Khrushchev is not, as Stalin was, a member of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.

Khrushchev's name is consistently linked with programs of agricultural reform in the boviet Union. Immediately after being assigned as Party Chief in Moscow and as a Secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev came forth as an advocate of amalgamation of the country's 250,000 collective farms into larger units and the removal of the peasant villages into more compact settlements of agrogorods. He supported the Brigade system of farm work organization by predicting an increase in grain production where large labor units could pursus large-scale farming with improved machinery. He also came forth in support of increased professional qualifications for the leading workers of kolkhozes, state farms, and machine-tractor stations. Except for the resettlement features, the agricultural program which he set forth in 1950 was essentially put into execution. The general program of expansion in agricultural activities through the use of hitherto uncultivated land and the maximum exploitation of modern methods was re-emphasized by Khrushchev after 1953. In some respects he may have staked his own political standing on the success of this program.

In addition to being identified with Soviet agriculture, Khrushchev also has broad connections throughout Heavy Industry. His concern for the mechanization of agriculture forms a link in this respect. Furthermore, he was for sometime the close political associate of industrial organizer Kaganovich, which undoubtedly forms another link. It may also be pointed out that Khrushchev spent his boyhood in the metallurgical section of the Donbas and received his technical education in the heavy industrial academy in Moscow.

Khrushchev has had occasion to administer the Stalinist "nationality

policy" (the building of Soviet states which are national in form, socialist in content) during his assignment in the Ukrains, where the Party faced the most challenging nationality problem in the Soviet Union. Integration of the Ukraine into the Soviet system involved overcoming social and political traditions emanating from an earlier experience of political separation from Russia and from Ukrainian historical ties with some western cultural forms. The development of collaborationist sentiments under German occupation combined with the above elements to comprise one of the most thorny political problems facing the Soviet regime toward the close of the war. In this connection it should be pointed out that Khrushchev has voiced Soviet aspirations concerning Eastern Europe, where an extension of the Soviet nationality policy is implied. One important feature of his outlook on this matter appears to be the establishment of permanent Russo-Polish friendship on the basis of joint action through the Communist Party. He has stressed the unity of the Slavic peoples as a "guarantee against enemy incursions." In post-war debates concerning the disposition of problems relating to the Soviet's Eastern European Satellites it is believed that Khrushchev supported strengthening the "Socialist States" in this area as opposed to Malenkov's advocacy of demilitarization and virtual dismantling of the German industrial complex.

Since the death of Stalin, Khrushchev has taken a more active role in foreign affairs. During 1953-5h he has participated in high-level discussions between Soviet leaders and top officials in the Soviet Orbit

states and has met other foreign dignitables. Speaking in Moscow in April 1954 and at Prague in June 1954, Khrushchev made bold foreign policy statements, more bellicose and hostile to the enemy West than declarations of his Party colleagues. His freedom from direct governmental responsibility may in part explain his license, while it is apparent that as top Party spokesman he is a forceful and no doubt effective propagandist. It is unlikely, however, that Khrushchev enjoys any more authority in Soviet foreign policy formulation than other members of the Party Presidium.

In view of Khrushchev's role as the leader in the denigration of Stalin, it is most instructive to examine his relationships to the Stalinist forces at earlier stages in his career. He was one of the few important leaders in the Party to attend the 17th Party Congress in 1934 as a delegate and survive. This places him clearly within the Stalin-Kaganovich faction at the time of the last real fight against the use of terror and the cult of personality. This took place in the years 1932 to 1934 and ended with the assassination of the leader of the liberal faction, Sergei Kirov in December, 1934. In short, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Khrushchev was in a position to do something to prevent Stalin from becoming the bloody dictator he became after 1934 (according to Khrushchev). But instead of opposing Stalin he was one of a small minority in the upper Party circles who definitely sided with Stalin.

Khrushchev is the man who announced the changes in the Party regulations at the 19th Congress in the fall of 1952. These regulations clearly indicated a behind-the-scenes move to shuffle the party leadership into some new pattern. It was apparently the first step in Stalin's plan for a new purge. Khrushchev, as usual, was the Dictator's handy man in announcing the changes. Harrison Salisbury's book, American in Russia contains an illuminating section concerning the political manipulations which were taking place within the Party organization at this time.

In concluding it should be pointed out that Marshall MacDuffie's series of articles on his interviews with Khrushchev are, to our know-ledge, the best sources of first hand information from a western writer on the man.

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STAT	13 July 1956	
	Memorandum for the Executive Assistant to the Director, J. S. Earm	an:
	Dick Harkness called to say that at a READERS' DIGEST confere yesterday in New York he was told that Herbert Hoover, Jr. had downgraded all the POW confessions to unclassified so that Bill Wh of READERS' DIGEST could do a book on brainwashing. The book will be out this fall. That knocked into a cocked hat the Harkness ide re a series on brainwashing.	ite,
	Harkness said he and his wife, however, want to do a Khrushch series and that they had discussed this with the Director and he s he would see what unclassified material could be furnished to them by CIA and what classified material we had could be declassified f their use. He will call later to see what they can get.	aid
STAT	I told him I'd be reporting next Monday for jury duty but tha	t
STAT		
	STANLEY J. OROGAN Assistant to the Director	

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12 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

This memorandum is for information only.

Mrs. Harkness telephoned last evening to say that she and Dick are leaving the city early today to discuss with their editors a series of magazine articles on brainwashing and Khrushchev. They will return tonight to Washington. She asks if it will be possible for them to know by tomorrow if you can make available to them unclassified data such as previously discussed with you.

STANLEY J. GROGAN

STAT	
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10 July 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

This memorandum recommends action.

A reminder from Richard Harkness for your action:

Dick Harkness asked me to remind you of a recent conversation he said you had with him regarding "brainwashing" and "Khrushchev."

Dick and his wife are planning some magazine articles, he said

he told you, on brainwashing and on Khrushchev.

You are quoted as saying that maybe CIA has some data on brainwashing that is unclassified or may be unclassified for the Harkness use; and that maybe CIA has some data on Khrushchev that would be newsworthy in a magazine article.

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STANLEY J. GROGAN

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CIA-RDP74-00297R000601240005-7

28 February 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

This memorandum recommends action.

Richard Harkness asked if I would transmit to you his invitation for you to speak at a time of your own choosing to an Overseas Writer's luncheon. He is the President for 1956. He said Joe Collins will be the guest at a luncheon on 20 March and maybe you would address them during the week of 25-31 March or early in April.

Recommend you accept but that the date be Tuesday the 10th or Tuesday the 17th of April. Nany of those at Overseas will have heard you on 2 March, and any date before 10 April might be less effective than one on or after that date.

STANLEY J. GROGAN